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Abstract
In the economic literature, the nexus between economic growth and corruption
is well covered, but there are only few empirical studies on cyclical variation of
corruption. Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011) in one such study. It finds that transitory
income and corruption vary in parallel, thus confirming the famous claim of
Galbraith (1997) that embezzlement flourishes in business booms and withers
in recessions. This paper tests the general validity of the finding by using a more
extensive dataset. The results are conflicting: corruption is found to shrink with
the increase in transitory income and vice versa. In other words, economic
booms foster integrity, and recessions make corruption bloom.
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1 Introduction
In the economic literature on corruption, there are many empirical studies on the correlation
between economic development and corruption. Most of them also show that corruption tends to
diminish as national income rises (e.g. La Porta et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000; Mo,
2001). Still, only a few empirical studies have tackled the question about the correlation between
business cycles and corruption. In recent years, this viewpoint has become more and more
important due to the growing understanding that cycles and the behavioural patterns of economic
agents are organically intertwined.
The original idea comes already from Keynes (1936), and e.g. Minsky (1975, 1986), and Akerlof &
Shiller (2009) represent more recent contributions to the discussion. Behavioural analyses
emphasize that the thought patterns of individuals, their constant ‘rational’ calculus, in a large
extent dictate rent-seeking, which in turn considerably contributes to economic disruptions at given
intervals of time. Quiggin (2010), and Varoufakis (2011) highlight the role of such biased behaviour
during business cycles, which occasionally burst into earth quaking economic catastrophes, like
that since the 2008 financial crisis.
The famous proposition by Galbraith (1997, p. 133) is that there always exists a considerable
amount of undiscovered embezzlement in the business life, and that it varies with economic cycles.
In  good times,  people  are  not  only  trusting  but  also  greedy,  which  makes  the  ‘bezzle’  grow.  In
depression, people get cautious and suspicious, and money is audited meticulously. Improving
business morality makes the ‘bezzle’ shrink.
Gokcekus and Suzuki (2011) is one of the few studies on the nexus between business cycles and
corruption. Taking Galbraith (1997) as a starting point, it builds on the fact that embezzlement is
a key element of corruption, and tests the proposition by using comprehensive measures of
perceived corruption. The study also finds substantial proof for the proposition: the results show
that, while long-term growth and integrity develop in parallel, corruption tends to boost in times
of short-term booms, and shrink in economic recessions.  This is  exactly what Galbraith says in
terms of the ‘bezzle’.
The core idea of this paper is to examine, whether the proof by Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011) on the
intuitively appealing proposition of Galbraith (1997) is valid in general. This is done simply by
replicating  the  original  study,  but  using  a  more  extensive  dataset.  The  dataset  includes  both
considerably more numerous country observations and a somewhat longer and more up-to-date
time coverage. In line with the original study, both economic growth (namely changes in permanent
income) and business cycles (namely changes in transitory income) are tested as possible
determinants of corruption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the model as well as the data used. Section 4
describes the estimation techniques, and reports the estimation results. Alternative measures of
corruption are used to check the robustness of the results, and to secure perfect comparability of
the results to those of Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011). Section 5 discusses the findings, and maps paths
for further study.
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2 Modelling and data
	
To aim of the paper is to test the effects of changes in national income on corruption. Both the
effects of long-term changes in permanent income and short-term fluctuations in transitory income
are studied. The modelling technique follows Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011), which in turn is an
application of the original formulation of Mélitz & Zumer (2002). The basic model can be written
as follows:
	
												
In equation (1), all country variables are expressed in relation to the whole sample of countries.
Cori,t stands for the level of corruption in country i (i = 1,…,N) in period t (t = 1,…,T) relative to
the average level of corruption over all countries in the sample. Thus, Cori,t is derived by dividing
the value of the corruption indicator in country i in period t by its average indicator value over the
whole period T. On the right-hand-side, parameters g denote the coefficients to be estimated, and
µ is the disturbance term.
Furthermore, PIi denotes country i’s permanent income, and TIi,t denotes transitory income, which
captures temporary deviations from permanent income. Both PIi and TIi,t are measured in terms of
GDP per capita, relative to the whole sample. Thus, PIi is derived by dividing country i’s GDP per
capita value at period t by the average of GDP per capita values over the time span t = 1,…,T. To
put it more simply, PIi is the average of country i’s income shares over time. Then, TIi,t is simply
the possible difference between country i’s income share and PIi in any period t.
Note that  reflects the response of corruption to the development of long run average income
PIi. Thus, it captures permanent changes in Cori,t. Likewise, 	reflects the response of corruption
to the variations in transitory income thus capturing changes in the time profile of Cori,t	. These
two effects can be separated, since the permanent effect remains even when there is no deviations
in the time series, whereas the transitory impact hinges entirely on such movements. Decomposing
equation (1) yields
													 	
													 	
where Cori is  the  average  of Cori,t over the time span t = 1,…,T, and hi ,t 	and ei ,t  are the new
disturbance terms. Since equations (2) and (3) add up to equation (1), it follows that hi ,t + ei ,t = µi,t.
Furthermore, as it is quite plausible that the effects from changes in transitory income to corruption
are not instant, possible lags in these influences should be taken into account, too.  In order to do
this, equation (3) can be re-written as follows:
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where j = 0,…,K denotes the number of lags, the cumulative sum of the time-specific coefficients
	captures the cyclical behaviour of corruption, and u i ,t 	is the error term.
In the estimations of models (2), (3), and (4), three types of data are used, namely one economic
variable, two corruption indicators, and one instrument variable. The economic variable consists
of country-wise time series of GDP per capita. This data come from World Economic Outlook
(from the IMF website). The data are expressed in current USD prices, and they are available for
113 countries worldwide over the time span 1998–2013. Full list of the sample countries is in
Appendix.
To measure the degree of corruption, the Control of Corruption (CC) indices are used. The indices
come from World  Bank’s  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators  2014  (WGI)  dataset,  and  they  are
available over the years from 1996 to 2013. However, since there are no economic data for the
years 1996 and 1997, and no CC indices for the years 1999 and 2001, the study covers only 14 time
periods. In addition, data on Corruption Perception Index (CPI) provided by Transparency
International are used, too. This is both for testing the robustness of the results from the CC-based
estimations and for comparing the results to those of Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011), which operates
solely with CPI. The indices are exclusively used for the same time span than the CC indices (that
is for 1998–2013 except the years 1999 and 2001), but they are available only for 74 countries
included in the CC panel1. Still, both the CC and CPI indices manage reasonably well to capture
the same information.
The original CC indices score from -2.5 to 2.5, with integrity improving to the positive direction.
For ease of interpretation, the CC indices are transformed by subtracting the original values from
3.5. This makes all the transformed index values vary from 1 to 6, with corruption getting worse
as the score rises. The original CPI indices score from 0 to 10, with the lower bounds indicating
utmost corruption and the upper bounds indicating perfect integrity. The CPI indices are also
transformed  by  subtracting  them  from  11  to  make  them  vary  from  1  (perfect  integrity)  to  11
(utmost corruption).
Lastly,  an instrumental  variable for GDP per capita is  needed to address the endogeneity issue.
Following Chowdhury (2004), Keefer (2007), and Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011), the absolute
geographic distance from the equator2, denoted Latitude, is used for this purpose. The data are from
the CIA website.
	
																																																								1	Those countries that are not covered by the CPI indices are indicated in Appendix by the superscript *. 		2	The scaled distances are reported in Appendix.
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3 Estimations and results
	
The estimations aim to test, whether permanent and/or cyclical changes in national income have
statistically significant effects on perceived corruption. In order to do so, equations (2), (3) and (4)
are estimated with appropriate techniques. In the estimations, all data are log-transformed in order
to make them conform more closely to normal distribution. This helps to correct for skewed data,
and increases the statistical validity of the empirical analyses. The findings, based on the use of CC
as the corruption indicator, are reported in Table 1.
Table 1: Effects of permanent and transitory income on corruption, CC as the corruption variable
(1998-2013)
Columns
Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4)
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS IV-2SLS OLS 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM
Constant ( ) 2.791a
(0.031)
3.253a
(0.074)
-1.604a
(0.036)
Permanent income ( ) -0.196a
(0.003)
-0.250a
(0.008)
Transitory income ( ) -0.197a
(0.004)
-0.327a
(0.027)
-0.34 -0.35 -0.345
Transitory income ( ) 2.216c
(1.312)
2.892
(1.867)
4.095c
(2.339)
Transitory income ( ) -2.556c
(1.323)
-3.295
(2.155)
-4.618b
(2.326)
Transitory income ( ) 0.053
(0.597)
0.133
(0.462)
Transitory income ( ) 0.045
(0.490)
Number of observations 113 113 113 2825 2825 2599 2373
Adjusted-R2 0.650 n.a.d 0.519
Wald teste 818.3a 146.48a 164.48a 157.09a 115.09a
Sargan testf (p-value) 1 1 1 1
Notes: The robust standard deviations are in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables.
OLS = ordinary least squares; IV-2SLS = instrumental variables - two-stage least squares; 2SGMM = two-stage generalized
method of moments.
a: Statistical significance at 0.1 percent error threshold
b: Statistical significance at 5 percent error threshold
c: Statistical significance at 10 percent error threshold
d: n.a. = not applicable; R2 is not an appropriate measure of goodness of fit when using the estimator of 2SLS.
e: The null hypothesis of the Wald test checks whether permanent income (PIi) = 0 for equation (2) is rejected.
f: The over-identifying restrictions test (Sargan test) postulates in its null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated with
residuals. Here, the test is robust to autocorrelation (p-value > 0.05), thus instruments are valid.
In Table 1, columns 2 and 3 report the test results of equation (2), columns 4 and 5 report the
results of equation (3), and columns 6, 7 and 8 report the results of equation (4). The two
regressions on equation (2) in columns 2 and 3 tell about the effects of changes in permanent
income on corruption. Column 2 reports test results derived by the Ordinary Least Squares
estimator (OLS), and column 3 reports those derived by the Two-Stage Least Squares estimator
(2SLS). In the 2SLS estimation, Latitude is  used as an instrumental  variable for GDP per capita
income (ref. Gokcekus & Suzuki, 2011).
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Recalling that the transformed CC indices get higher values as corruption increases, the clearly
negative and highly significant coefficient estimates from both OLS and 2SLS unanimously say
that integrity improves with the increase of permanent income, and vice versa. This corresponds
to the finding of Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011). Most of the earlier empirical studies concerning
economic growth and corruption also end up to the same conclusion (see e.g. Shleifer & Vishny,
1993; Mauro, 1995).
While the literature on corruption is very rich on the long-term effects of incomes on corruption,
there are much less studies under the prism of business cycles. The estimation of equation (3) aims
to tackle these economic realities. The first regression in column 4 is based on the OLS estimator,
and the second regression in column 5 is based on the two-step system Generalized Method of
Movement (2SGMM) technique proposed by Blundell & Bond (1998). The latter method
incorporates the instrumental variable Latitude into the analysis. The method is also generally more
efficient, offers rigorous control over the instrument matrix, and takes into account all the
orthogonality conditions.
Both  the  OLS  and  2SGMM  methods  yield  results  that  suggest  a  clear  link  between  transitory
income and corruption. Moreover, the clearly negative estimates (-0.197 with OLS, and -0.327 with
2SGMM) are highly significant saying that an increase in transitory income unambiguously
dampens corruption, and vice versa. In other words, this implies that business booms rather reduce
than increase corruption. This is in strict contrast with the belief that booms should stimulate rent-
seeking opportunities and pump up the ‘bezzle’, as described by Galbraith (1997), and supported
by Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011)3.
The estimations of equation (4) test whether the lagged effects of the changes in transitory income
predict variations in corruption. Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011) also follows the same approach, but
only with a one period lag (that is K=1). Here, equation (4) is estimated separately with one, two
and three period lags.  The 2SGMM method is  used,  and the results  are presented in columns 6
(with K=1), 7 (with K=2), and 8 (with K=3). Recall that the effect of the transitory deviations in
income on corruption is appraised through the cumulative sum of the estimates of the coefficient
 in equation (4).
Starting from the regression results in column 6, the estimate of the coefficient of transitory income
at period t is = 2.216, while that in period t-1 is = -2.556. Both are statistically meaningful at
10 % threshold. It follows that the aggregate impact of transitory income (that is the cumulative
sum of the two estimates) is  -0.340. Likewise, with K=2, the cumulative impact is -0.350, but this
time the estimated lagged coefficients stay insignificant. With K=3, the cumulative impact is -0.345,
the coefficients are seldom significant, but the cumulative sum is still always negative. This is in
line with the estimation results of equation (3) thus supporting the previous conclusions.
The last things to do are to test the robustness of the findings, and to verify perfect comparability
of the results to those of Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011), which uses CPI as the corruption variable.
Thus, both robustness and comparability can be simply guaranteed by performing the same tests
again with same estimators, but with CPI as the corruption variable. The results of these alternative
estimations are reported in Table 2.
																																																								3	Note that Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011) examines only 39 countries over 13 years between 1995–2007.	
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Table 2: Effects of permanent and transitory income on corruption, CPI as the corruption variable
(1998-2013)
Equation (2) Equation (3) Equation (4)
Columns 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OLS IV-2SLS OLS 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM 2SGMM
Constant ( ) 4.502a
(0.070)
4.348a
(0.133)
-3.240a
(0.071)
Permanent income ( ) -0.318a
(0.007)
-0.301a
(0.015)
Transitory income ( ) -0.324a
(0.008)
-0.480a
(0.051)
-0.48 -0.48 -0.43
Transitory income ( ) -0.844
(2.030)
-1.019
(2.101)
3.426c
(1.979)
Transitory income ( ) 0.364
(2.031)
1.004
(2.194)
-4.242c
(2.419)
Transitory income ( ) -0.465
(1.136)
-0.245
(1.033)
Transitory income ( ) 0.629
(0.703)
Number of observations 74 74 74 1850 1850 1702 1554
Adjusted-R2 0.617 n.a.d 0.562
Wald teste 88.174a 88.330a 87.549a 93.342a
Sargan testf (p-value) 1 1 1 1
Notes: The robust standard deviations are presented in parentheses below the estimated coefficients of the explanatory
variables. OLS = ordinary least squares; IV-2SLS = instrumental variables - two-stage least squares; 2SGMM = two-stage
generalized method of moments.
a: Statistical significance at 0.1 percent error threshold
c: Statistical significance at 10 percent error threshold
d: n.a. = not applicable; R2 is not an appropriate measure of goodness of fit when using the estimator of 2SLS.
e: The null hypothesis of the Wald test checks whether permanent income (PIi) = 0 for equation (2) is rejected.
f: The over-identifying restrictions test (Sargan test) postulates in its null hypothesis that instruments are not correlated with
residuals. Here, the test is robust to autocorrelation (p-value > 0.05), thus instruments are valid.
Comparison of the estimation results of Table 1 and Table 2 shows that the change of the corruption
indicator from CC to CPI does not affect the results significantly. As to the effects of permanent
income on corruption (γ1), the relevant signs remain negative, the effects are even stronger, and
statistical significance is again high. The same holds also for the effects of transitory income (γ2).
The cumulative lag effects are now -0.480 whether K=1,	or K=2, and -0.430 with K=3, which
follow closely the same pattern as those in Table 1. Thus, all the conclusions with respect to CC as
the corruption index are confirmed.
To sum up, the results confirm the common view that permanent income and integrity develop in
parallel. On the other hand, the results confront the intuitively appealing argument of Galbraith
(1997) that economic booms should pump up the ‘bezzle’, and especially its empirical verification
by Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011).
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4 Conclusions and discussion
	
This paper is an econometric study on the possible correlation between the level of corruption and
national income. The estimations concern the effects of permanent and transitory income on the
perception of corruption for a maximum of 113 countries worldwide over 14 periods over 1998–
2013. The benchmark for these investigations is Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011), which finds a positive
correlation between permanent income and integrity, but a negative correlation between transitory
income and integrity. In particular, the latter correlation would say that economic booms trigger
corruption, and recessions dampen it. The result is noteworthy, because the important question
about the link between business booms and corruption is rarely studied empirically, and because it
confirms the famous description on the evolution of the ‘bezzle’ by Galbraith (1997).
This paper verifies the finding of Gokcekus & Suzuki (2011), and that of the majority of empirical
research on the issue, that the increase of permanent income tends to reduce corruption (and vice
versa). However, the paper contradicts the important finding that changes in transitory income and
integrity should be negatively correlated. In contrast, the results unambiguously show that that
short-term fluctuations in incomes are also positively correlated with integrity. This is to say that
economic booms reduce corruption and recessions trigger it.
The result that corruption diminishes during economic upturns and increases during downturns
has several  implications.  In particular,  it  means that the issue is  highly data dependent.  The fact
that the results of this paper are generated from more extensive data than those of Gokcekus &
Suzuki (2011) does not necessarily entitle rejection of the former ones. Moreover, the setting shared
by both studies does not yield a solid proof for the proposition of Galbraith (1997). Embezzlement
is only one character of corruption among other, maybe more visible factors. It may well be so that
the extent of the ‘bezzle’ in the hidden operation of firms and banks is not properly monitored by
the corruption perception indices.
There are alternative explanations for corruption, too. For example from the ‘grease the wheels’
viewpoint (Méon & Sekkat, 2005), it might be reasonable that such corruptive greasing would be
especially necessary in downturns, but not so important when the business is booming in any case.
The power of alternative explanations may also differ between countries. The ‘bezzle’ explanation
might be relevant in more developed countries, while the ‘grease the wheels’ explanation might fit
better in less developed countries. In the latter countries the role of economic booms in yielding
resources to anti-corruption activities may also be crucial (Khan, 2004; Davigo & Mannozi, 2007).
Last  but not least,  the setting shared by Gokcekus & Suzuki  (2011) and this  paper may also be
inappropriate from the beginning. First, the application of the model of Mélitz & Zumer (2002)
may be misleading. The original model is used to study regional redistribution, which makes it
reasonable to express all variables in relation to the whole sample of countries. In the present
purpose, this may be too confusing thus blurring the findings. Second, the interpretation of e.g.
Quiggin (2010), and Varoufakis (2011) is that corrupted behaviour and embezzlement, particularly
in the financial sector, rather cause business cycles than the other way round. This is to say that
corruption is a major driver of financial crises, which occasionally develop into economic
catastrophes. Therefore, the direction of causality between business cycles and corruption should
be examined carefully.
All in all, there certainly is need to dig deeper.
		 9
References
Akerlof, Georges A. and Shiller, Robert J. (2009). “Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the
Economy and Why It Matters for Global Capitalism,” Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Blundell, Richard and Bond, Stephen (1998). “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in
Dynamic Panel Data Models,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 87, Pp. 115–143.
Chowdhury, Shyamal K. (2004). “The Effect of Democracy and Press Freedom on Corruption:
An Empirical Test,” Economics Letters, Vol. 85, Pp. 93–101.
Galbraith, John K. (1997). “The Great Crash 1929”. New York: Mariner Books, Houghton Mifflin
Company.
Gokcekus, Omer and Suzuki, Yui (2011). “Business Cycle and Corruption,” Economics Letters, Vol.
111, Pp. 138–140.
Keefer, Philip (2007). “Clientelism, Credibility, and the Policy Choices of Young Democracies,”
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 51 (4), Pp. 804–821.
Keynes, John M. (1936) “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money” Paris: Edition Payot,
1942.
Khan, Mushtaq H. (2004). “Corruption, Governance and Economic Development,” In Jomo, K.S.
and Ben Fine (eds) 2004. The New Development Economics. New Delhi: Tulika Press and London: Zed
Press.
La Porta, Rafael, Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio, Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. (1999).
“The quality of government,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15, 222–279.
Mauro, Paolo (1995). “Corruption and growth,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, Pp. 681–
712.
Mélitz, Jacques and Zumer, Frédéric (2002). “Regional redistribution and stabilization by the center
in Canada, France, the UK and the US: a reassessment and new tests,” Journal of Public Economics,
Vol. 86, Pp. 263–286.
Méon, P. G. and K. Sekkat (2005). “Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of corruption?”
Public Choice 122, pp. 69–97.
Mo, Pak Hung (2001). “Corruption and Economic Growth,” Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.
29, Pp. 66–79.
Quiggin, John (2010). Zombie Economics. How dead ideas still walk among us. Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Vishny, Robert W. (1993). “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
108, Pp. 599–617.
Treisman, Daniel (2000). “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study,” Journal of Public
Economics, Vol. 76, 399–457.
Varoufakis, Yanis (2011).”The Global Minotaur. America, the True Origins of the Financial Crisis and the
Future of the World Economy.  London and New York: Zed Books.
		 10	
Appendix: List of countries/territories in the sample
Albania*(0.4556)
Argentina (0.3778)
Australia (0.3000)
Austria (0.5244)
Bahrain* (0.2889)
Bangladesh* (0.2667)
Barbados* (0.1456)
Belgium (0.5611)
Belize* (0.1906)
Benin* (0.1033)
Bolivia (0.1889)
Botswana (0.2444)
Brazil (0.1111)
Brunei Darussalam* (0.0478)
Bulgaria (0.4778)
Burundi* (0.0367)
Cambodia* (0.1444)
Cameroon (0.6667)
Canada (0.6667)
Central African Rep.* (0.0778)
Chile (0.3333)
China (0.3889)
Colombia (0.0444)
Congo, Republic of* (0.0111)
Democratic Rep. of Congo*
Costa Rica (0.1111)
Cote d’Ivoire (0.0889)
Cyprus* (0.3889)
Denmark (0.6222)
Dominican Republic* (0.2111)
Egypt (0.3000)
El Salvador (0.1500)
Fiji* (0.2000)
Finland (0.7111)
France (0.5111)
Gabon* (0.0111)
Gambia* (0.1476)
Germany (0.5667)
Ghana (0.0889)
Greece (0.4333)
Guatemala (0.1700)
Honduras (0.1667)
Hong Kong (0.2461)
Hungary (0.5222)
Iceland (0.7222)
India (0.2222)
Indonesia (0.0556)
Iran* (0.3556)
Ireland (0.5889)
Israel (0.3478)
Italy (0.4722)
Jamaica (0.2017)
Japan (0.4000)
Jordan (0.3444)
Kenya (0.0111)
Korea, Republic of (0.4111)
Kuwait* (0.3256)
Laos* (0.2000)
Lesotho* (0.3256)
Luxembourg (0.5494)
Malawi (0.1478)
Malaysia (0.0256)
Maldives* (0.0350)
Mali* (0.1889)
Malta* (0.3944)
Mauritania* (0.2222)
Mauritius (0.2241)
Mongolia* (0.5111)
Morocco (0.3556)
Mozambique*(0.2017)
Mexico (0.2556)
Nepal* (0.3111)
Niger* (0.1778)
Namibia (0.2444)
Netherlands (0.5811)
Norway (0.6889)
New Zealand (0.4556)
Pakistan (0.3333)
Panama* (0.1000)
Paraguay (0.2556)
Peru (0.1111)
Philippines (0.1444)
Poland (0.5778)
Portugal (0.4367)
Qatar* (0.2811)
Romania (0.5111)
Rwanda* (0.0222)
Saudi Arabia* (0.2778)
Senegal (0.1556)
Sierra Leone* (0.0922)
Singapore (0.0136)
South Africa (0.3222)
Spain (0.4444)
Sri Lanka* (0.0778)
Sudan* (0.1667)
Swaziland* (0.2922)
Sweden (0.6889)
Switzerland (0.5222)
Syrian Arab Rep. (0.3889)
Taiwan (0.2589)
Tanzania (0.0667)
Thailand (0.1667)
Togo* (0.0889)
Trinidad and Tobago*
(0.1222)
Tunisia (0.3778)
Turkey (0.4333)
Uganda (0.0111)
United Kingdom (0.6000)
United States (0.4222)
Uruguay (0.3667)
Venezuela (0.0889)
Viet Nam (0.1778)
Zambia (0.1667)
Notes: The total sample of countries (113 countries) is used in the estimations based on CC. The superscript * marks  those 39
countries that are not covered by the estimations based on CPI, where the number of country observations is 113-39=74 countries.
The absolute distance of each country from the equator is reported in parenthesis (the scale is from 0 to 1, with higher number
indicating further distance from the equator).
